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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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by Britain and America as the booty of Russian Imperialism ? Surely
this would constitute nothing less than an indisputable breaking of the
Anglo-Polish Treaty of 1939, and the Americans' withdrawal from the
principles of the Atlantic Charter.
In an epoch, however., when treaties were fulfilled only as long as it
suited the stronger Power, such a break could not be considered as unusual.
Had British diplomacy put forward the thesis in 1941, to the effect that
Britain had pledged Polish c independence * and not the ' frontiers of
Poland^ and the integrity of her territories ? for this very purpose ? These
commitments of the Anglo-Polish Treaty had been signed five days L efore
the outbreak of war and, therefore, may not have been remembered by the
British; on the other hand, during the years of war which followed, those
same commitments were referred to publicly on numerous occasions by
different British statesmen, and during those same years British propa-
ganda had unrestrictedly linked them with the justice and honour of the
British nation. Those same commitments were, indeed, very deeply im-
printed on the heart and brain of Britain and the United States, and it was
a sheer impossibility to destroy the noble feelings of the Great Democra-
At this stage of the event,, it certainly would have been foolhardy in
any case to publicly announce the abandonment of Poland to her fate.
It was Moscow who discovered the method by which they could safely
proceed with the annexation of the Polish Republic, a method which was
calculated not to arouse too great a wave of indignation or suspicion in the
countries of democracy. The Soviets merely once more applied those
tactics which had proved so successful in the conquest and enslavement
of the Ukraine. The plan of the Kremlin might be recapitulated as
follows : Stalin's aim for Poland was her liberation and the establishment
of a c strong, integral and independent State ' under the condition of a
e close alliance.' At the same time, the Kremlin intended conducting an
action for the subordination of the country on the following lines. Firstly,
the leading element would be proclaimed c Fascists ' or c German colla-
borators ' and marked down for extermination, while secondly, the
remainder would be treated as the  sympathisers * or e potential sym-
pathisers * of the Soviets who were expressing a c desire' to unite with
them. The internal disintegration of the Polish community would be
conducted with the assistance of a sponsored government comprised of
their own agents and backed by all that powerful apparatus which they
had at their disposal in the Red Army and the N.K.V.D. Any resistance
of the Polish nation, thus completely isolated from abroad, would be
effectively paralysed within the country itself. The Kremlin only
required two things from the Allied Governments in order to expedite the
work of establishing Stalin's Poland. One was that pressure be brought
to bear on the Polish Government in order that it should be urged to come
to an agreement with Russia's proposals, and the other that the Polish